In this response paper, the sharp sociological,
social, economic and ideological analyses of the authors are taken to a new level as the
psychological roots of the social dynamics are exposed. Alternative strategies for
catalysing change in conflicted complex systems are explored and the importance of access
to the core symbolic levels of ideology (racial, political and religious) is stressed.
[March 1987]
[The South Africa Collection is a series of background and position papers written in
preparation for and as an outcome of a six-week period of community
consultancy in the Western Cape in May and June 1987]
*(South Africa Without Apartheid by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley was published by University of California Press, London, in 1986)
* * * * * * * * * *
In
their Introduction the authors indicate that the book:
"...
addresses three fundamental questions: How has the morally reprehensible
apartheid order in South Africa survived so long? What will bring about its demise and how will it vanish? What kind of society, state, and racial relations
can be expected beyond apartheid?" [p.1] |
The
strength of this book lies in the breadth and scope of its analysis of the
status quo, its survey of the different trends and tensions, splits, divisions
and interactive policy relations within the present political, social and
economic matrix of the province. This
intense study of the presenting topology of the here and now is clearly based
upon historical analysis and awareness of the patterns which have led through a
prolonged process of social evolution over time. The historic treatment, although not overtly represented in the
structure of the book, is continuously present as a further dimension of the
analysis.
However,
there are other fundamental questions which are not addressed, perhaps the most
important of which concerns the psychodynamic processes which generate the particular
topology at any point in time. It is
not sufficient simply to refer to ideology or religion, or belief systems, as
if they were some kind of instinctive datum of the human species. The addition of psychosocial analysis to the
study would render it much more powerful, both in its diagnosis and in its
prescriptive potential.
In
contrast to 'The Kairos Document' and certain radical and revolutionary
posturing, the authors look for an evolutionary process of reform with
continuity, rather than a convulsive, catastrophic process of revolution and
possible resurrection. In this they
face the fundamental agenda of enabling significant social change under
conditions of very high stress, low resource and rapid time pressure. It is precisely these conditions in which
the psychodynamics of the situation become predominantly important and in which
the more superficial layers of socio-political and economic analysis, while
necessary, are not in themselves sufficient.
"We unashamedly confess a reformist bias: the minimization of
suffering here and now seems to us a worthy goal even though it may occur at
the expense of a more noble dream; to postpone small-scale reform in the hope
that present misery will accelerate a more fundamental transformation to us smacks
not only of cynicism but of immorality. Indeed it is true that apartheid cannot be reformed but must be
eradicated. Yet this dismantling of a
political system does not necessarily require the destruction of a
society. It is an illusion that the
alternative can only emerge from the ashes. If this were so, it would hardly be worth the price." [p.8] |
The
application of catastrophe theory to social change, and the understanding of
conversion reactions in social systems placed under massive pressure would be
useful tools at this point. Just as
social monitoring within the culture of a prison can give indications of the
imminence of social breakdown, so monitoring of the kind of incidents which
occurred at Sharpeville and again in Langa, Soweto et al, can be used to
indicate how close to the discontinuity on the catastrophe surface a particular
society has come. As negative feedback
loops in the system shift the presenting equilibrium nearer to its point of
disequilibrium, little shifts over the edge occur at key points, for instance:
"On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the infamous Sharpeville
incident of 21 March 1960, South African police, without provocation or
warning, killed twenty unarmed Black marchers at Langa township in the Eastern
Cape. Most were shot in the back. The outnumbered contingent of White and
Black police with two armoured vehicles felt that the Blacks, on their way to a
funeral, would threaten the White township.
The repetition of this crudest form of state violence against
politicized youngsters and workers threatened by recession after two and a half
decades of anti-apartheid opposition suggests that little has changed in the
repression by a minority regime. The
rulers command the guns, and the subordinates are left with no alternatives but
to submit or perish." [p.9] |
While
a certain amount of pressure in a system is a prerequisite for precipitating
social change, undue pressure allows the flooding of psychotic anxiety and
paranoid imagery and the unstable escalation of chaos and brief psychotic
episodes within the system. At this
point the polarities in fact idealise and entrench into more and more sharply
defined conflict, which heads towards a win/lose or lose/lose scenario, rather
than a negotiated win/win outcome.
The
authors are clearly aware of the formative role of symbolism and construct
reification in generating the group consensus which then legitimised the
Afrikaner regime.
"Afrikaner nationalism achieved its goal of securing control of the
South African state through an initial skilful use of the group's symbolic
resources rather than by use of any material advantages. Ethnic entrepreneurs manipulated language
and religion and manufactured historical myth until a relatively strong sense
of unity was forged. After this
gradual, cumbersome process of identity formation under the influence of a few
professionals and clerics, in the 1920s and 1930s the movement laid economic
foundations for a prosperous ethnic bourgeoisie." [p.44] |
I
suggest that it is the reified symbolic structures of the Afrikaner ideology
which now require careful reanalysis and resolution if a deconstruction of
apartheid is to be successful, rather than simply an armed conflict between
ideologically secure camps. My own
understanding of the psychodynamics involved would indicate that this kind of
programme of analytic deconstruction, symbolic reinterpretation and a dynamic
withdrawing of the paranoid projection mechanisms which elevate the construct
in the first place, offers an extremely powerful point of intervention into the
otherwise fixated and conflicted system. That suggestion is undergirded by the authors' further statement:
"Ethnic entrepreneurs used religion, in addition to language, as a
crucial tool for mobilization [D.T. Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom; Andre du
Toit and Hermann Gilomee, Afrikaner Political Thought, 1780-1850]. Without the predicants of the Calvinist
churches to give impetus to the ethnic movement, Afrikaner nationalism would be
inconceivable." [p.49] |
Although
the religious dynamics do not appear to be very powerful in the equilibrium of
apartheid as it is at the moment, any attempt to lift the web, as it were, will
reveal the religious roots of the dynamic, and the critique of religion is the
sine qua none of social criticism in this context, even though that critique
may itself require an analysis of the psychodynamic core of Christianity and
the other main world religions, and a new and more profound understanding of
the systemic psychosis which such ideological constructs and symbolic
structures represent.
"In the absence of an unconstrained political leadership, it
remains for Black clergy to articulate Black grievances authentically. But this 'clerictocracy' becomes divisive as
soon as these leaders focus on their religion. The worldwide Islamic revival, and some Hindu factions, for example,
fragment the Indian community, which had been much more united in a secularized
political front. Divided religious,
even more than linguistic, ethnicity ultimately serves to fracture rather than
bond." [p.50] |
The
socio-historical dynamics of religion are quite clear, in that it establishes
very sharp in-group/out-group boundaries, with reified paranoid projection and
intense systemic splitting. The process
is backed by the depersonalisation of the out-group and the raising of
ideological assumptions to the realm of absolute truth, which brooks no
possible questioning, and therefore fixates the system. While the authors are quite aware of the
effects of this process, which is quite fundamental to the dynamics of the
South African social system itself, they do not appear to have penetrated the
psychodynamic core which gives rise to the phenomena of religious structures in
the first place. As such their analysis
lacks access to the causal parameters which set up the dynamics of the social
system in question. In effect, their
analysis is a subsystem analysis, requiring a widening of level to take in the
total system and thereby incorporate the causal parameters that generate
sub-system behaviour.
The
role of the symbolic in mobilising unconscious emotive group energy around
particular goals is well illustrated in the paragraph:
"The discourse among Afrikaner nationalists is best summarized in
party posters at the October 1985 by-elections. The National Party (NP) poster said, 'Don't shoot. Think'; the
HNP reversed it to proclaim, 'Shoot. Don't think'. The CP leaders Treurnicht suggested that the security forces
should be 'unleashed'. He portrayed
half-hearted repression as the cause of continued unrest. Another poster with a young blond girl
admonished: 'Don't repeat Rhodesia for her sake', equating majority rule with
child molesting." [p.61] |
The
more extreme ideologically and religiously motivated group requires the decephalisation
of its constituency. If action can be
based upon hypothalamic triggering of pituitary gland adrenal release, then the
moderating influence of rational critique can be outlawed. Mobilisation for acute fight/flight and
paranoid posturing is again reinforced by fears of rape and sexual retaliation,
which resonates deeply with the repressed guilt of historic Afrikaner
miscegenation. The sexual and primal
roots of the psychodynamics of the core Afrikaner ideology demand incisive
analysis and clear public communication as a prerequisite of deconstruction and
de- energising of the polarisation process.
The
limitation of the authors' analysis is indicated by their comments:
"The South African conflict does not concern the eradication of
prejudice and fear; this will always exist among mobilized competitors. How the conflicting claims and perceptions
can be channelled into mutually acceptable compromises remains the fundamental
issue of successful constitution-making." [p.7lf.] |
One
of the assumptive parameters of the study does appear to be that changes in the
fundamental psychodynamic structures of society are impossible. The scenarios of intervention and conflict
resolution therefore represent some way of redistributing the pain and
generating a more or less stable set of compromise negotiations. There is some grammatical unevenness within
this passage and it is difficult to make any real sense out of the phrase "the
South African conflict does not concern the eradication of prejudice and
fear". Perhaps it makes more sense
if you say that the authors believe that "resolution of the South African
conflict does not depend upon the eradication of prejudice and fear". However the grammatical lacuna seems to
indicate preoccupation, or disruption by some kind of associated material
around this area. My own sense is that
the conflict is intensified by the perseveration of prejudice and fear and in
so far as the feedback loops within the present situation enhance and polarise
and intensify prejudice and fear, just so far does the conflict move to a more
and more intransigent and fixated position. Intervention, therefore, within the structures of prejudice and fear and
the paranoid psychodynamics at an individual and social level on which they are
based, is precisely a very powerful point of intervention, and I would argue a
necessary prerequisite for conflict resolution. The authors are clearly aware of the danger of the opposite
tendency, namely the increased prejudice and fear leading to chaoticisation and
total anarchic paranoia, fragmentation and social collapse:
"Making South Africa 'ungovernable' in order to facilitate
liberation risks having a post-apartheid society that also will be
ungovernable, as a result of irreparable damage done to the country's economy.
" [p.89] |
Intensification
of the revolutionary struggle, leading to a catastrophic discontinuity and
period of costly reconstruction is probably the most dysfunctional way of
achieving the desired goal of social change. However the achievement of significant social change in an evolutionary
capacity, sustaining win/win options for all parties and maximising the
resource base of the system, requires the twin initiatives of deconstruction of
the conflicted constraint dynamics, whilst sustaining high levels of motivation
in the desired direction.
The
authors recognise the dysfunctionality of increased polarisation, even though
it is the policy apparently being adopted by Black theology and 'The Kairos
Document'.
"The more each side defines the other as evil and engages in what
Allan Boesak has called 'holy rage', the less politics works." [p.109] |
If
the process of idealisation is pushed to its absolute, in which the in-group
perceives the out-group as some reification of Satanic evil, the conflict to
the death appears to be the only way of resolving the situation, other than a
deconstruction of the paranoid ideology.
The
issue of legitimation is quite central here, and the authors note:
"Only if the dominant group suffers from the illegitimacy of its
racial domination will a consequential legitimation crisis arise. Herein lies the simultaneous vulnerability
and strength of the present South African system." [p.l42] |
The
Achilles heel of any ideological system is the reified construct of its
legitimating ideology. An intervention
consisting of a very clear and incisive analysis of the construct serves to
generate a legitimacy crisis, which again is a precondition for significant
change. Without such intervention the
dynamic conservatism of the religious ideology, while not obvious until
significant change is actually attempted, emerges with immense power as soon as
the change initiative is attempted. So
where cultural and religious constructs coincide with racial group boundaries
we have an intense collusional paradigm sustaining the equilibrium of the
status quo at all costs.
"Societies where racial divisions coincide with cultural
differences are unlikely to eradicate racial divisions. Differences in religion or language
reinforce visibility. Cultural heritage
maintenance then becomes at the same time a perpetuation of racial group
cognition. In South Africa, however -
fortunately - races and cultures overlap greatly. Most people in the urban sector speak one of the official
languages, the major Christian churches have members of more than one racial
group, and the educated of all racial groups share a common cultural outlook
and aspirations. This allows class
divisions that cut across racial boundaries." [p.l97f.] |
The
attempt to generate new bonded, ideologically uniform, in-groups as a way of
overthrowing the dominant Afrikaner ideology actually destroys one of the
strong points of the South African situation, namely that religious and racial
boundaries do in fact overlap. In that
sense the South African situation is seen to be a fossilised, or outdated,
racist and religious fragmentation, passing through a slow but sure
legitimation crisis, towards an emergent inter-racial class structure. However, if the underlying dynamics of paranoid
projection and boundary fragmentation are not annealed in the long term, we
will find the class warfare structure that emerges in the secularised
de-racialised state to be quite as incisive and divisive as the present racial
boundaries within the religiously undergirded state. Construct conversion would move the splitting from racial lines
to class lines. The intensity would
still remain.
There
is indeed a common Christian culture across the racial boundaries, but the
common Christian dynamics of reified boundary construct, scapegoating, denial
of negativities, displacement, projection, do not necessarily constitute a
resource in the situation, in spite of the authors' comment to the contrary:
"When popular spokespersons for the oppressed affirm the common
Christianity of the oppressors, they cannot be seen as a dehumanized personal
enemy to be eliminated with callous ruthlessness - as happens in religious
violence from Belfast to Lebanon, India, and Sri Lanka. The racial outsider remains simultaneously a
Christian insider who must be enlightened, cajoled, or even threatened but who
cannot be destroyed." [p.198] |
The
bankruptcy of the Westernised Christian model leads some people to seek a more
primitive and universal religious construct. Regression, however, is no way forward into the future. It is impossible to turn the clock back to
the pre-Christian, African culture, romanticised into some kind of uniform
socially cohesive pattern. On the
contrary we have to push through the constraints of the Christian construct,
unpicking it as we go, moving with courage into the more vulnerable, less
defended, realities of deconstructed post-Christian humanism.
"The hope is expressed that African religion could substitute for
the ideological hold that Christianity has acquired over the African mind. Ancestor worship, Mphahele hoped, could
assist Blacks to 'snap out of the trance into which we were thrown by Western
education' [E. Mphahele, cited in Ursula Barnett, A Vision of Order,
p.256]. In fact, however, a
fundamentalist religious dynasty has successfully synthesized traditional
beliefs and colonial Christianity into a far more enduring brand of status quo
support than the unfulfilled promise of mainstream Christian equality has ever
been." [p.202] |
Social
systems under stress tend to revert to more fundamentalist and more deeply
defended structures, in order to contain the anxieties being released in the
face of threatened restructuring and change.
Analysis,
deconstruction and education go hand in hand.
"And a precondition for serious deracialization must be a massive
public reeducation effort, primarily of Whites in the civil service. Their ideological confusion, vested
interests, and anxiety about the future block fundamental progress. ...
If the nature of the post-apartheid society could be convincingly
clarified, apocalyptic fantasies and illusions would give way to realistic
hope. A justified belief in a secure
future can in itself free energies submerged by a stubborn determination merely
to hold out." [p.209f.] |
As Elliott Jaques so sharply pointed out, the viability of a social system depends
upon the mechanisms used to contain psychotic anxiety and in so far as the
primitive paranoid-schizoid defences of splitting, denial, projection,
reification, symbolisation, dissociation, scapegoating and so forth are the
norm, just so far is that social system dysfunctionally resistant to realistic
social change. Not only group
boundaries, between the inside and the outside, but also temporal boundaries between
the present and the future are invested with the most intense levels of
anxiety, leading to paranoia, not only about invasion from without but of
confrontation with a future which appears to be too terrible to contemplate. We have to recognise that much of the
emotional energy vested in structures and ideologies emanates from these
primitive levels of anxiety defence and from the psychotic anxieties pent up
behind them. Annealing of the
underlying levels of primal anxiety, the deconstruction of the individual and
social defences, and annealing of the concomitant splits within the social
topology, enable the system to respond much more flexibly and realistically
during the process of transition.
The
primal mythology of heaven and hell, paradise lost, paradise regained and al1
the other symbols of the corporate foetal unconscious, reified into the
religious and ideological construct, which then undergirds the totalitarian
state are poignantly expressed in the paragraph:
"It has been said that the dreams of paradise are the seeds of
totalitarianism. Milan Kundera has
warned about glorifying the alternative utopia: 'People like to say: Revolution
is beautiful, it is only the terror arising from it which is evil. But this is not true. The evil is already present in the
beautiful, hell is already contained in the dream of paradise and if we wish to
understand the essence of hell we must examine the essence of the paradise from
which it originated. It is extremely
easy to condemn gulags, but to reject the totalitarian poesy which leads to the
gulag by way of paradise is as difficult as ever' [Milan Kundera, The Book of
Laughter and Forgetting (New York: Penguin, 1981, p.234)". [p.213] |
Although
African nationalism is not itself idealist in this sense, the profound strength
of the underlying idealising drives and defences should not be
underestimated. Rhetorical and
charismatic attempts to mobilise mass emotion, using the symbols of paradise
and the fear of hell emerge in this meta-stable context all too easily.
If
intervention at the level of the psychodynamic roots of the construct is an
essential prerequisite for the enabling of significant social change in the
system, then in geography and institution there is also need to intervene at
the symbolic core. So that the
interpretation of the symbolism of the Voortrekker monument and dynamic
intervention within the key universities and the heartland of the Dutch
reformed theology are indicated as important points for critical
interface. Fascinatingly the authors
describe Stellenbosch as
"the academic cradle of the tribe" [p.252] |
Perhaps we have to go back behind the cradle to
the womb, or even to the preconceptions if we are to understand the tribal
structures of apartheid.
|